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I.
In her new and provocative book, Dorothy Roberts collects stories.
There are many, but here are two notable ones. The first involves an Afri-
can woman and her husband. They live in Italy. A few years ago, in order
to obtain assistance in becoming pregnant and carrying a child to term, the
couple went to an Italian clinic that specializes in ultramodern reproductive
technologies. The clinic helped the couple by providing them with a donor
egg and then fertilizing the donated egg with sperm from the couple. The
resulting fertilized egg was then implanted into the African woman's
womb.
There would seem to be nothing especially remarkable about this par-
ticular "miracle baby." After all, the first such birth occurred about twenty
years ago, and there have been thousands since. Nonetheless, this particular
birth received national media attention. Why? The reason is that the Afri-
can woman from Italy gave birth to a white child. The child is considered
white because both the woman who donated the egg and the African
woman's husband are white. The African woman, as the gestational
mother, provided no genetic material to the child she bore. The couple, it
turns out, deliberately chose the race of the child because they believed that
their child "would have a better future if it were white." Although most
parents who utilize in-vitro fertilization deliberately choose the race of their
children, those choices do not cause fanfare of any kind. So why did this
particular birth cause a stir? To answer this question, Dorothy Roberts tells
a second story.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I owe thanks to Mary Becker,
Lorray Brown, Emily Buss, Rebecca Eisenberg, Paul Garcia, Michele Landis, and Deborah Malamud
for comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. I am grateful to Roseanne Swain and Dawn Craan for
helping me to think about the role that Christian faith plays in the lives of many Black women. And I
appreciate the assistance that my sister, Dr. Nicole Florence, provided in interpreting research contained
in medical journals.
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This story takes place in the United States under far different circum-
stances. In an attempt to pressure pregnant drug users into treatment, law
enforcement officials from Charleston, South Carolina, in collaboration
with the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), instituted a policy
of prosecuting pregnant women if their babies tested positive for illegal
drugs. Forty-two South Carolinian mothers were arrested under the policy
between 1989 and 1994. All but one of them were Black, and the one non-
Black in the group had a Black boyfriend (a fact noted by the nurse in
charge of the program). Some of the women were arrested within hours of
having given birth. They were taken to jail in handcuffs and leg shackles,
still bleeding from delivery.
In her new book, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the
Meaning of Liberty, Dorothy Roberts argues that these stories share a com-
mon element. She claims that these stories provide the basis for the case
that "the meaning of reproductive liberty must take into account its relation-
ship to racial oppression."' Roberts says "books on racial justice tend to
neglect the subject of reproductive rights; and books on reproductive free-
dom tend to neglect the issue of race."2 Because of these gaps, we cannot
begin to understand the uproar over a Black woman and her white husband
deliberately choosing to carry and give birth to a white child or the impetus
behind a program such as the one implemented in South Carolina. To fully
understand these stories we must consider an analysis such as the one that
Roberts provides us. In seven compelling and fascinating chapters, Roberts
traces her argument. Although much of the book's content has appeared
elsewhere in the form of law review articles,3 the organization of the book is
fresh, and the style is inviting to even the non legally-trained reader.
The material in the book proceeds chronologically. The first chapter,
entitled "Reproduction in Bondage," considers the numerous and brutal
methods that were used and supported by law to constrain and limit the re-
productive autonomy of Black women who were slaves. Roberts demon-
strates powerfully how Black women were forced to become "breeders" of
additional slaves-their own children. Roberts also explains how the rule
of "hypo descent," law constructing the American notion of race, and as a
consequence, slavery, all but abrogated the right of Black women to parent
their children because slave children always were in danger of being sold
I DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 6 (1997).
2 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 4.
3 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935 (1996); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563 (1996); Dorothy E. Rob-
erts, Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607 (1995); Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U CHI. L. REv. 209 (1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Ad-
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away from their mothers. Chapter one also sets up a problem that Roberts
refers to again later in the book-the "maternal-fetal" conflict that was ex-
pressed when slaveholders who wanted to whip pregnant slaves forced
these women to lie face down on the ground over a hole in the ground dug
to allow room for their pregnant bellies in an attempt to protect the child.
Roberts uses this example to show that the maternal conflict is not, contrary
to the claims of some feminist scholars, new. Although advances in mod-
em medicine such as ultrasound make it much easier for us to imagine the
fetus apart from its mother, Roberts shows that the method slave masters
used to beat pregnant slaves created the same conflict between Black
women and their unborn children.
In chapter two, "The Dark Side of Birth Control," Roberts recasts the
well-known connection between Margaret Sanger's Birth Control move-
ment of the twenties and thirties and the Eugenics movement of the same
era in terms of racial dynamics. She charts the tension that many Blacks of
that time experienced as they tried to reconcile their desire to control the
numbers of poor people born into their communities by promoting access to
birth control with the sometimes racist undertones of the Eugenics move-
ment. She points out that it was racialist fears that ultimately popularized
birth control and in the process increased women's access to it.
In the third chapter, "From Norplant to Contraceptive Vaccine," Rob-
erts brings the material on birth control up to date by exploring the market-
ing and promotion of long-acting birth control methods such as Norplant
and Depo Provera to poor, Black women. She argues that rather than en-
hancing reproductive freedom, as many feminists have claimed is the case
with respect to these birth control methods, Norplant and Depo Provera are
used to truncate Black women's childbearing options.
In chapters four and five, Roberts tacldes the policies that have been
debated on the front pages of the newspapers: criminalization of drug use
(crack use in particular) by pregnant women, and policies designed to en-
courage women on welfare not to have (or prohibit them from having, de-
pending on your perspective) additional children. These policies, Roberts
claims, disproportionately affect women of color. Thus, Roberts argues, the
connection between these policies and constraints on the reproductive
choices of women of color is unavoidable. But Roberts pushes the argu-
ment further than that. She argues that the Blackness of those who are tar-
geted for control is what makes such policies acceptable in the first place.
She argues further that these policies are merely the latest in the long list of
laws, programs, and policies that devalue Black motherhood.
Chapter six, the most thought-provoking in the book, is forward-
looking. In this chapter Roberts links the use of new reproductive technol-
ogy, such as in vitro fertilization, to the devaluation of Blackness and the
simultaneous pursuit, primarily by white men, of privilege associated with
whiteness. To make this argument Roberts relies on the juxtaposition of
several widely reported news items and asks us to examine both what was
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said and the unspoken assumptions. What is revealed by the silences is
particularly challenging, as I will explore below. Finally, in chapter seven,
Roberts tells us how we should address the problems, puzzles, and conun-
drums she has explored, telling us how to rethink our conception of repro-
ductive freedom.
In all, Killing the Black Body is an impressive piece of work and a very
good read. The book's primary strength is the critical manner in which
Dorothy Roberts brings together news clips, historiography, examples of
public policy, and other more personal stories to back up her claims about
the ways in which race and racial politics affect how we make decisions
about constructing and creating relationships with those who are closest to
us-our spouses, our children, our parents. Many of us do not stop to think
about why it feels important to have children that are genetically related to
us. To the extent that we do think about it, we may resort to a familiar story
about biological impulses. We assume that the desire to propagate our
genes is "hard-wired." In like manner, many of us do not question the indi-
vidualistic assumptions on which the recipe for success in America is predi-
cated.4 Even if we think that some kind of structural reformation is
necessary to achieve real equality in this country, we may be persuaded by
arguments that suggest that policy should help people who receive public
aid make more "responsible" decisions such as delaying childbirth-per-
haps even indefinitely-until having children is "affordable."5 By bringing
together in one place issues we often discuss at the dinner table in a disag-
gregated fashion (family caps, the war on drugs, race selection in adoption,
the link between the lack of birth control and poverty) and drawing unobvi-
ous connections between these issues, Roberts jostles us out of some of
these easy assumptions. It is in jostling and shocking that Roberts is most
effective. It is impossible to read this book without thinking critically about
what Roberts has said-and possibly changing your thinking as a result of
the enterprise.
Roberts expects more out of her readers at the end of the day, however.
Certainly she wants to challenge, but she also wants to convince. However,
the book's strength-its use of narratives and images to reveal previously
unexplored effects of race-is also its weakness. Challenging is not the
same as persuading, and Roberts wants to convince readers that we can
change our approach to decisions we may previously have thought innate
and unchangeable. More than that, Roberts wants readers to agree that her
reconceptualized vision for reproductive liberty-and the means to achieve
it-are right. Whether the reader is convinced by Roberts' exposition in
4 John Kenneth Galbraith referred to these assumptions about the way the economy works as the
"Conventional Wisdom" in his book, THE AFFLUENT SOCiETY (1971).
5 For an interesting commentary on this problem, see Christopher Jencks and Kathryn Edin, Do
Poor Women Have a Right to Have Children?, AMERCAN PROSPECT, Winter 1995, at. 43.
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chapter seven depends a great deal, I think, on how persfiaded the reader is
by the first six chapters. This review will focus on two of them. I will first
address Roberts' exploration of the devaluation of Black motherhood, the
centerpiece of which is encapsulated in chapter four, "Making Reproduction
a Crime," with an exploration of the implementation of a program in South
Carolina that resulted in a large number of women being prosecuted after
their newborns tested positive for drugs. Next, I will address Roberts' ex-
cavation of the "genetic tie," which she treats in chapter six, "Race and the
New Reproduction." I use the term excavation deliberately because it is the
best way to describe how Roberts digs deep under what seems relatively
permanent in order to reveal something that, while old, is very new to us.
I hope to show through a brief treatment of these two issues that Rob-
erts more than makes the case that the meaning of reproductive liberty must
take into account its relationship to racial oppression. I also hope to show
in this Essay that the analysis of some of the phenomena that Roberts ex-
plores in her book is more complicated than even she has shown. Class dif-
ferences between Blacks and whites are important, and much of Roberts'
analysis depends upon these differences. Roberts, however, does not simi-
larly point out class differences among Blacks themselves. This failure to
uncover the heterogeneity of Black public opinion and Black politics clouds
some of the conclusions that Roberts draws. At the same time, the lack of
class analysis limits unnecessarily the strength of Roberts' vision of repro-
ductive liberty. By pointing out some of these complexities, I hope to en-
rich Dorothy Roberts' important account of the connection between race
and reproductive liberty. I also hope to show that by considering some of
these complexities, Roberts' vision might be extended in important ways.
II. DEVALUATION OF BLACK MOTHERHOOD
In chapter four of her book, Dorothy Roberts claims that the criminali-
zation of reproduction, as illustrated by the story of the South Carolina
mothers, occurs because "society does not view [poor, Black] women as
suitable mothers."' This claim rests on the groundwork Roberts lays in the
first few chapters of her book, in which she shows that the policies that con-
structed American chattel slavery and the discriminatory treatment of Black
women that occurred even after Emancipation make the criminal policies
she analyzes in chapter four possible. Additionally, Roberts argues that
criminal punishment of poor Black women who take drugs and decide to
carry their children to term devalues Black motherhood in general. It is
both evidence for and part of the engine driving the lower esteem in which
society holds Black mothers.
Roberts points out that there is an alarming trend in criminal prosecu-
tions of women whose babies test positive for drugs. She argues that the
6 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 152.
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impetus for these policies cannot possibly be concern for the babies of these
women and that the real reason these policies are implemented is because
the politics of race in America facilitate them. Roberts first argues that the
prosecutions have occurred coincident to the rise in the use of crack, an il-
legal drug that statistics show is used disproportionately by Black people.
Roberts questions the concern surrounding crack use by arguing that the
panic over the problems associated with crack were greatly overblown
compared to other drugs such as cocaine.7 She then adds that the concern
over maternal use of crack was also greatly overblown! Next, she claims
quite persuasively that the media uproar over both general and maternal
crack use set the stage for state intervention. Some of these interventions
were extremely punitive. Roberts focuses on two especially harsh policies:
(1) a case in which a Florida woman was prosecuted for "delivering" co-
caine to her children through their umbilical cords in the seconds following
their births; and (2) the South Carolina program highlighted earlier in which
forty-two women were prosecuted when their babies tested positive for
drugs.
Roberts' analysis of the South Carolina program is the centerpiece of
chapter four. She argues that this program was clearly discriminatory, and
she links the discrimination in the program to the devaluation of Black
motherhood. Here is an outline of her argument: first, the patient pool at
MUSC, the only hospital that serves indigent Black patients in Greenville
County, South Carolina, contains disproportionate numbers of poor, Black
women. Second, although the purpose of the program supposedly was to
protect babies exposed to drugs in the womb, law enforcement officials sin-
gled out only MUSC and only Medicaid patients in the obstetrics clinic for
the program. Third, South Carolina officials made no real effort to ensure
that the pregnant drug users had access to drug treatment. How is it, Rob-
erts asks, that only these patients were targeted when there is evidence (in
Florida, at least) that white women use illegal drugs at the same rates as
Black women? Roberts argues that racial politics enabled the prosecution
of poor, Black drug users. She points to comments made by one of the ar-
chitects of the program, Charles Condon, who is now South Carolina's at-
torney general, for support: "' [T]here's not enough political will to move
after pregnant women who use alcohol or cigarettes. There is, though, a
7 While the amount of media attention it received may not have been justified, it is quite clear that
the harms associated with crack, both for the user and in the communities in which its sale often are
concentrated, can be quite severe-more severe even than the problems associated with the use of a drug
like cocaine from which crack is derived. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,
47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1290-91 (1995) (noting that there are important differences between crack and
powder cocaine); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, (forthcoming,
AM. CRIM. L. REV.) (documenting the harms to communities of concentrated poverty caused by the sale
of crack cocaine).
8 This argument is more convincing than the previous one. See infra text accompanying notes 14-
15, explaining the harms associated with maternal drinking of alcohol, which is not criminalized.
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political basis for this interagency program. Leaders can take a position
against crack."' 9 Roberts asks us to imagine a scenario in which forty-two
white, suburban mothers were dragged in chains from suburban hospitals
hours after having given birth. If we cannot imagine it, then Roberts has
made the point, right?
Like Michael Tonry, who has argued that the War on Drugs' hugely
disparate impact on urban Black Americans was entirely foreseeable,"
Roberts argues well and persuasively that the South Carolina program pre-
dictably affects minority poor women and that the program's architects
must have foreseen this consequence. An argument can be made that the
effectiveness of a law enforcement program that produces racially asym-
metrical outcomes is compromised when those outcomes are spatially con-
centrated in communities of concentrated poverty." For example, I have
shown that when viewed through the lens of social organization theory,
which grounds the prevalence of crime in community-level phenomena
rather than an individual's characteristics, traditional deterrence-worshiping
approaches to crime that attempt to manipulate an individual offender's in-
centives to commit crime by heaping more severe punishment on a particu-
lar offense may confound that goal. When traditional forms of punishment
like imprisonment are concentrated on individuals from communities that
are disproportionately poor, there will be predictable negative conse-
quences-more broken families, higher levels of unemployment, general
reduction of community economic well-being, and other conditions that dis-
rupt social organization. This process will ultimately discourage law-
abiding residents from working collectively to prevent their own victimiza-
tion and from transmitting law-abiding values to their children.
Roberts, however, relies on a more obvious criticism of the program-
rather than providing drug using mothers with an incentive to seek treat-
ment, the South Carolina program was more likely to drive these mothers
away from treatment. After considering Roberts' arguments, a reader has
strong doubts that the program will achieve the goals its promoters have set
for it. But Roberts seeks to do more than simply convince us that the pro-
gram is an ill-considered idea. She argues that the reason why such an ill-
considered program could be enacted and implemented in the first place is
that Black women are not valued as mothers and that the prosecutions
themselves further devalue Black motherhood. Roberts writes: "It is the
right to choose that is burdened by criminalizing conduct during pregnancy.
... Race has historically determined the value society places on a woman's
9 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 178 (quoting a Charleston solicitor).
10 See MICHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995).
1 See Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. L. REv. 579 (1997); Meares, su-
pra note 7.
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right to choose motherhood. The devaluation of Black motherhood gives
the right to decide to bear a child unique significance."' 2
The linchpin of her argument has two facets. One, it is hard to argue
that the criminal policy helps Black children; and two, many groups of
pregnant women expose their children to harm in utero without being sub-
ject to criminal sanctions. Roberts notes that the most telling evidence of
the state's disregard for the health of Black infants is its failure to respond
adequately to the abominable rates of Black infant mortality. For example,
in 1992, the infant mortality rate among Blacks was 16.8 per thousand
births compared to 6.9 for whites, and in Washington D.C., the mortality
rate among Black infants is triple that for the nation as a whole. 3
Roberts argues that if the state really cared about Black children there
would be greater national commitment to provide prenatal health care rather
than to prosecute poor mothers who abuse drugs. One easy response to this
point is that there are many ways of helping Black children. The fact that
the state has chosen to criminalize maternal crack use instead of urge na-
tional prenatal health care does not mean that the state is indifferent to
Black children's well-being. The problem with this response, Roberts'
work suggests, is that it is hard to believe that the state desires to help those
children by choosing a method that will so obviously backfire. Roberts
wants to convince us that the reason for this choice is related to the moth-
ers' race.
For those who are not convinced by part one of her argument, she turns
to part two, that there are many other maternal activities that are more
harmful to babies than smoking crack. Consider the effect on an unborn
child of drinking excessive amounts of alcohol. It is estimated that 1 in 600
children are born each year with permanently debilitating conditions associ-
ated with fetal alcohol syndrome. 4 Roberts reminds us that fetal alcohol
syndrome is the leading known cause of mental retardation. 5 Although
drinking during pregnancy is increasingly frowned upon, and although
many women are subject to social sanction for doing so, they are not pun-
ished by the criminal justice system like mothers who smoke crack. Of
course, alcohol is legal and crack is not, but that fact merely begs Roberts'
question. Roberts would likely reply that the main reason mothers who
drink are not subject to criminal punishments is that white women are far
more likely to drink than to use crack. Thus, society comes up with alter-
native, non-criminal methods to control the harm that these women do to
their unborn babies. Even granting the illegality of cocaine, Roberts shows
12 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 182.
'3 Id. at 183-84.
14 See The National Organization of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Fact Sheet,
<http://www.nofas.org/matemal.htm>.
is ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 177.
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that mothers who use crack are punished more severely than are non-
pregnant crack users, because they are subject to additional punishment for
taking drugs while pregnant. 6 It is the fact of their pregnancy that exposes
them to greater sanction. And this fact is what Roberts relies on for her
conclusion that the policy devalues Black motherhood.
Roberts makes a challenging argument. Still, a certain logical leap is
necessary in order to reach the conclusion that Black motherhood is deval-
ued because there has not yet been a move to criminally punish women who
drink while pregnant, while examples of criminal punishment for women
who use illegal drugs exist. First, the point about the potentially greater
harm that alcohol causes to unborn children does not mean that cocaine use
by pregnant women is innocuous. Research shows that cocaine use during
pregnancy can cause quite serious harm to unborn babies. 7 It is true that
the jury is still out on the permanence of complications caused by maternal
drug use; however, the consequences of the use in combination with the fact
that use of crack cocaine is illegal certainly justify concerns for maternal
illegal drug use.
Second, we have to consider the fact that all illegal drugs do not cause
identical harm to unborn babies. Different rates of use of different illegal
drugs could justify distinctions. Roberts points to data showing that equal
numbers of Black women and white women used drugs while pregnant.
These data also show that white pregnant women tested positive more fre-
quently for marijuana than Black women (14.4% of white women vs. 6%
for Black women), but Black women tested positive more frequently for
cocaine than white women (7.5% of Black women vs. 1.8% of white
women).'" If there is reason to consider cocaine use more "serious" than
marijuana use-both public opinion and penalties for use of the two drugs
seem to reflect that sentiment-then the different rates of usage of these two
drugs could explain the different treatment users receive. 9
16 We might think that this type of prosecution is simply inefficient. It is "double dipping" to
prosecute pregnant drug abusers twice. A more efficient regime would focus on maternal alcohol con-
sumption precisely because it is not already criminal and causes at least as much, if not more harm, to
unborn children.
17 See Fonda Davis Eyler, Marylou Behnke, Michael Condon, Nanci Stewart Woods & Kathleen
Wobie, Birth Outcome From a Prospective, Matched Study of Prenatal Crack/Cocaine Use: L Interac-
tive and Dose Effects on Health and Growth, 101 PEDIATRICS 229-37 (1998); Fonda Davis Eyler,
Marylou Behnke, Michael Condon, Nanci Stewart Woods & Kathleen Wobie, Birth Outcome From a
Prospective, Matched Study of Prenatal Crack/Cocaine Use: I. Interactive and Dose Effects on Neuro-
behavioral Assessment, PEDIATRICS (1998).
is Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1435 n.85.
19 See The Gallup Organization. The Office of National Drug Control Policy: Consult With Amer-
ica: A Look at How Americans View the Country's Drug Policy (Mar. 1996) (showing that 51% of re-
spondents believe crack cocaine is the biggest problem in the country today,. compared to 6%
mentioning marijuana); see also Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, (forthcoming, CHI.-KENT L. REV.)
(noting the differences in treatment by the criminal justice system of different types of drugs).
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Medical research also justifies differential treatment. While cocaine
may not cause birth defects as severe as those caused by alcohol, it often
causes greater problems for newborns than marijuana. Roberts never even
mentions the fact that Black women are much more likely than white
women to use an illegal drug that is more harmful to their babies. This
omission makes her analysis less convincing to those who know something
about this area than it would be if she were more willing to discuss points
that cut against her.
There are obvious non-race based reasons behind the use of policies
that are directed primarily at pregnant crack users. Yet, it also is true that
the women subject to criminal policies that compromise their decision to
continue to carry their babies to term are more likely to be poor and Black.
Because it appears that these women are rather uniquely affected, does this
mean that Black motherhood is devalued, as Roberts has argued? To
answer this question, we must ask: Devalued by whom?
Roberts answers this question by claiming that "society" finds these
prosecutions acceptable. Although she does not state it outright, when
Roberts refers to "society" it is likely that Roberts is referring primarily to
the non-Black majority. In order to conclude with Roberts that society de-
values Black motherhood, we must believe that non-Blacks think that preg-
nant Black crack users are representative of "Black motherhood."
Work by sociologist Larry Bobo demonstrating that non-Blacks-
whites anyway-tend to negatively stereotype all Blacks might help to
support Roberts' claim. For example, Bobo shows that although the
prevalence of the beliefs that formed the foundations of "Jim Crow" racism
(the notion that Blacks are innately inferior to whites) is fading fast, a new
belief system among whites has formed.20 Unlike Jim Crow racism, the
new belief system features a claimed commitment to equality in principle
without a similar commitment to policies to implement changes that can
assist the achievement of greater equality between Blacks and whites.2 '
Bobo calls these new beliefs "laissez-faire" racism. He explains that
laissez-faire racism depends upon the persistence of anti-Black stereotypes.
He points to a 1990 study showing that whites tend to perceive Blacks as
more likely than themselves to be unpatriotic, violence prone, unintelligent,
lazy, and preferring to receive welfare rather than work.22 Bobo argues that
these stereotypes drive the support among whites for punitive welfare
reform and abrogation of affirmative action. If he is right, then it is also
likely that white attachment to those stereotypes supports Roberts' claim
that subjecting Black mothers to criminal punishment for drug use is
20 See Lany Bobo, The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream, in CML RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
WRONGS (J. Hingham ed., 1997).
21 Id. at38-40.
22 Id. at 40.
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predicated in part on negative assumptions about Blacks. The reason why
this work helps support Roberts' claim is that society (as I suspect she de-
fines it) devalues Black motherhood through general stereotyping. The re-
spondents who make negative assumptions about Blacks in the relevant
categories of conduct assume that all Blacks are likely to engage in the
same deviant behavior. This point suggests at the very least the lesser
value-in the eyes of whites--of Black people. Thus Roberts might be able
to use this work to say that because the policies she criticizes are tied to
negative stereotyping, they devalue Black motherhood, since Black mothers
are, most often, the ones who reproduce Black people.
There is something to this. But there is a problem with the assumption
that the whites who stereotype Blacks are the members of "society" whose
views are the only ones pertinent to societal devaluation of Black mother-
hood. Society is complicated and, of course, it is not exclusively white.
We must also examine the role that Black people played in the enactment
and promulgation of policies like South Carolina's. Does the Black com-
munity identify with the women Roberts describes?'s It would be inconsis-
tent with Roberts' argument, I think, if it turned out that a substantial
number of Black people are part of the "society" that condemned the poor,
Black mothers who take drugs while pregnant and supported the very poli-
cies that Roberts has so persuasively argued are ineffective. What if it turns
out that many Black people-including Black women-think that Black
mothers should be encouraged to stop using drugs and penalized if they fail
to do so?
Roberts points out that both Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard
and the police chief of Charleston, South Carolina, two Black men, have
made arguments in support of the program which attempts to coerce women
into treatment by threatening them with criminal penalties for failing to
choose treatment. Roberts claims that Black people are very skeptical of
the criminal justice system, and she criticizes these two men for their failure
to recognize the skepticism she notes. She also argues that the opinions of
two Black men do not make the program any less racist. It turns out,
though, that these two men are not alone. Roberts' dismissive stance to-
ward Kennedy and Greenberg does not take account of the fact that public
opinion surveys suggest a strong conservative bent among Blacks in matters
of drug law enforcement. For example, the 1988 National American Elec-
tion Study indicates that 82% of Blacks, compared to 74% of whites, sup-
23 Obviously, the idea of the "Black community," like the notion of "society" is complex. I intend a
notion of community that relies upon connections between Black people based on consensual group
identity and similarity of experience. When group identity is strong, the experiences of one individual in
the group are sometimes very important to all individuals in the group. Thus, it is possible that many
Black individuals see the treatment of Black maternal drug users as a phenomenon that affects them per-
sonally in important ways. For a theoretical and empirical explanation of the notion of a community,
see MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 75-84 (1995)
(explaining the concept of "linked fate").
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ported increased federal spending on the War on Drugs.24 Additionally, The
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, a Washington think tank
devoted to research on issues of concern to African Americans, recently
found that 75% of a national sample of Black people surveyed supported
so-called "three-strikes" laws despite the fact that those polled must know
that such penalties will be disproportionately borne by Black people.'
These data certainly undermine the argument that Blacks do not believe
they will benefit from increased law enforcement.
One should not, however, take what I have just said as an argument
that Black public opinion indicates that the vast majority of Blacks whole-
heartedly favor criminalizing maternal drug use or even the War on Drugs.
My own empirical research on public opinion and drug law enforcement
suggests that Black opinion on drug law enforcement is complex.26 With
respect to drug law enforcement, I have shown that Blacks, those who are
poor especially, are much more likely than whites to hold a position I call
"Dual Frustration." 7 Individuals who fall into this category tend to be
older, African American women-many of them mothers, no doubt. These
mothers want better crime control and law enforcement in their neighbor-
hoods, but they are concerned about the way increased law enforcement af-
fects their children. These data are relevant to what Black Americans think
about the criminalization of maternal drug use. While the Black women
surveyed in the General Social Survey may not want their pregnant neigh-
bors to be subjected to the harsh treatment accorded in South Carolina, they
may well criticize the decisions of pregnant women from their communities
who take illegal drugs.
It is true that the circumstances in many communities of concentrated
poverty make life difficult for the people who live there. But it is also true
that, despite these difficulties, many of the women who live in these com-
munities do not take drugs while pregnant." Such women might well adopt
a hard line against maternal drug use. Sociologist Elijah Anderson explains
that many of these women would occupy a position in the community that
24 Id. at 183, Table 8.1.
25 See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks' Crime Concerns; African Americans Show Less
Confidence in System, Favor Stiff Penalties, WASH. POST, April 21, 1996, at Al1.
26 See Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legaliza-
tion and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 137 (1997).
27 Id. at 140.
28 See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
(1990). Anderson details the clash between "decent" values-hard work, family life, the church, and
law-abiding behavior-held by some families in the community he researched and "streetwise" values-
drug culture, unemployment, little family responsibility, and crime-held by other families. Sociologist
William Julius Wilson argues that most Black families are committed to what could be called "decent"
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Anderson refers to as an "old head."29 They are often perplexed and frus-
trated by the conduct that is a part of the drug culture, conduct that is all too
prevalent in many poor urban neighborhoods. Such women, who are com-
mitted to law-abiding values, may well support the very regimes Roberts
criticizes. They may support these policies not just because they think they
will cause drug abusers to make different decisions, but because they are
interested in signaling to each other and the outside world that drug use
during pregnancy is emphatically not what Black motherhood is about.
Thus, Roberts' failure to criticize the mothers whose plight she describes
undermines some of the force of her argument. The point is this: Those
who argue that Blacks obviously benefit from "get tough" approaches to
drug law enforcement ignore the nuances within Black opinion that I have
identified in my own research. Yet I also think that critics of "getting
tough" like Roberts stand on a weak foundation when they claim that there
is a lack of support for law enforcement among Blacks.
Roberts' argument that Black motherhood is devalued by certain
criminal law policies relies upon a class-based analysis. We ought to ask,
then, whether it is Black mothers or poor mothers who are devalued. Class
is, of course, a slippery concept.3" By emphasizing its importance to the is-
sues Roberts raises, I do not mean to suggest that it is simple to assess-
wealth, income, education, occupation, and consumption are all relevant.3
Nor do I want to suggest that it is easy to separate class and race. The very
fact that they are so intertwined in this country is an indication of their
multiplicative rather than additive nature. Despite these issues, I think it
would be useful to complicate Roberts' analysis by engaging the interaction
between race and class. For example, reconsider the hypothetical that Rob-
erts asks us to ponder: Can you imagine a white woman dragged in leg
shackles from a suburban hospital hours after birth? I admit that it is hard
for me to imagine. But can we imagine middle-class Blacks being dragged
from suburban (or urban) hospitals? Can we imagine poor white women
being subject to the South Carolina policy? I have a hard time imagining a
middle-class woman of any race being dragged from a hospital in chains.
At the same time, it is not so difficult for me to imagine a poor white
woman subjected to the South Carolina policy. I think Roberts would
agree. She explains in great detail in chapter two that poor white women
were also subject to eugenic sterilization and higher rates of experimental
gynecological surgery than were their middle-class counterparts.
Perhaps because criminal law policy-especially policies connected
with the War on Drugs-are so obviously racialized, it is easier than it
probably should be for Roberts to conclude that it is intended to devalue
29 ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 73-76.
30 See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-BasedAffirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 Tex. L. Rev.
1847, 1863-94 (1996) (describing the various components of class analysis).
31 Id.
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Black motherhood without a more thorough treatment of class dynamics.
But I was intrigued by a policy she pointed to but did not analyze in depth
that might have shed some light on the question of class. Roberts notes that
"the most common penalty for a mother's prenatal drug use is the perma-
nent or temporary removal of her baby."32 An analysis of this phenomenon,
in conjunction with the material Roberts already presents in her book,
would be extremely useful. Because these civil actions are common and
because the numbers are no doubt much higher than the criminal prosecu-
tions of Black women whose newborns test positive for drugs, the decision
of child and family welfare services to remove a child from his or her
mother could really substantiate the claim that Black motherhood is being
devalued. Removal more directly implicates an embedded belief that Black
women lack mothering skills than do the scattered examples of criminal
prosecutions, because it occurs under the freighted auspices of "abuse" and
"neglect."33 These actions also help to highlight the role class plays in the
evaluation of motherhood. Drug use interacts in important ways with class
because poor mothers are less likely to get good prenatal care and even
good basic nutrition. All of these factors combine to produce an assessment
of a woman's ability to mother.
These procedures cry out for greater analysis precisely because, unlike
the criminal cases, they do not make headlines except in the most extreme
circumstances. The process appears seductively straightforward. After all,
it might be in the "best interests of the child" to remove him or her
"temporarily" from a poor mother who takes drugs and is really not
"capable" of providing good care. And if it is in the child's interests,
shouldn't we expect to see children who display the obvious signs of fetal
alcohol syndrome removed from mothers? We need information about the
demographics of these removals to know what role race plays in this policy
that is so obviously connected to assessments of parenting. Are pregnant
Black women who use drugs more likely to have their children removed by
the state than their white counterparts? Are their children taken away for
longer periods of time? Are they more likely to have their parental rights
terminated?
In addition to answering the previous quesitons, it would be useful to
ask questions of the Blacks affected by the removal process: what do Black
people think about these removals? What role do Black social workers play
in this process? In contrast to overwhelmingly white officials, such as
prosecutors in the criminal justice system, state social workers are them-
selves often Black. Any assessment of what "society" thinks about poor,
Black mothers who take drugs and Black motherhood in general should
32 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 159.
33 See generally Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems
of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1992).
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take account of their role and view in the removal process. And what about
family members who come to the children's rescue? Many grandparents
and aunts and uncles are saddled with the responsibility of children whose
mothers are in jail or who have been removed by the state. 4 An analysis of
this unseen and largely silent phenomenon would have highlighted the role
of class as well as race in constructing the perceptions of motherhood, and
it would have strengthened Roberts' argument concerning the devaluation
of Black motherhood.
III. THE GENETIC TIE
The willingness of Black grandparents and aunts and uncles to take in
and parent their daughters' and siblings' children as if these children were
"their own" is an important part of the story Roberts tells in what I think is
the most exciting and thought-provoking chapter in her book. One of the
most interesting things about chapter six, "Race and the New Reproduc-
tion," is Roberts' claim that the "genetic tie"-our relationships with those
to whom we typically consider ourselves to be closest to, such as our par-
ents and children---depends a great deal on the construction of race in
American society. Roberts argues that, in contrast to whites, Blacks place
much less stock on the importance of the genetic tie (the biological connec-
tion between a parent and a child). She explains that "the social and legal
meaning of the genetic tie helped to maintain a racial caste system that pre-
served white supremacy through a rule of racial purity."3 The genetic tie
between a Black slave mother and her child made that child Black, and
therefore a slave, no matter that the child also may have had a genetic tie to
a white slaveholder. In contrast, it was argued that if a white woman had a
racially mixed child, she played a role in corrupting the white race, as only
white women could produce white children.36
Roberts uses this contrast in relative weight that the above culture of
the time placed on the genetic ties to parents based on race to help us to see
that all genetic ties were not equal, as we would otherwise think. After all,
each parent, slave mother and slaveholder father, contributed an equal
amount of genetic material to create the child in question. Roberts shows,
however, that social construction played a role in interpreting the impor-
tance of the connections. The value of using the term genetic tie is in its ob-
vious grounding in biology. The policies of hypo descent were assumed to
be natural, following Bobo's notion of Jim Crow racism. By using a scien-
tific term (and an implicit invocation of "natural" law) to describe a com-
pletely socially constructed phenomenon, Roberts helps the reader to see
parallels between historical policies constructing race and the continuing
34 See Juliet Bruce, Kinship Families: Caring for Children Outside the Foster Care Arena, WASH.
POST, April 22, 1997, at D5.
35 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 267.
36 Id. at 268.
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relevance of race in the decision we make concerning our reproductive de-
cisions today. Roberts then explains that because the notion of white supe-
riority was grounded in biological terms and supported by law, Black
Americans have resisted grounding self identity in biological terms because
of this-history of the social construction of the genetic tie. Instead, Black
Americans have "developed a race consciousness rooted in a sense of peo-
plehood" supported by politics rather than genetics 7
Dorothy Roberts uses these ideas to create an innovative and imagina-
tive analysis of the role that race plays with respect to new reproductive
technologies. While some claim that new reproductive technologies, such
as gestational surrogacy and in-vitro fertilization, should be praised and
welcomed for their potential to allow the infertile to have to access to the
possibility of producing children that are genetically related to them, Rob-
erts reveals a different view of the use of these methods. First, she exposes
distributional inequities to show that even though poor, Black women are
the most likely group to be infertile, this group has the least access to these
innovative technologies. Second, and much more interestingly, she shows
that the use of these technologies are bound up with an obsession for ge-
netic ties that reinforce the value of "whiteness" and devalue "Blackness."
Roberts demonstrates the second point through a compilation of cases
and news items. To bolster her argument that the new reproductive tech-
nologies rest on an underlying ideology of whiteness, she notes that whites
and white women in particular will subject themselves to the long, painful
ordeal that is necessary for IVF treatment before resorting to adoption be-
cause it is so important to them to have a genetically related child. And,
moreover, white couples will consider adopting a child of almost any other
race (assuming they cannot get a white child) before they will consider
adopting a Black child. 8
Roberts identifies a further index for the value of whiteness: the fact
that in a few instances when white women have used artificial means to
conceive and through clinic negligence have borne racially mixed children,
these births have been viewed as freaks by the media. In these cases it is
true that the women involved had contracted to be inseminated with their
(white) husband's sperm, so a mixed race child is an immediate indicator of
the fertility clinic's failure to fulfill the contract. But Roberts argues that
the fact that the sperm came from someone of the wrong race added a new
dimension of harm. "This second harm to the mother was the fertility
clinic's failure to deliver a crucial part of its service-a white child."4
37 Id. at 261.
38 See id at 273.
39 In contrast, if a mix-up had been with another white man's sperm, it might have taken quite a
while before anyone noticed that breach. In fact, it may never have been noticed.
40 ROBERTs, supra note 1, at 252.
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The case which opened this Essay is another example Roberts uses to
demonstrate the value of whiteness that is connected to new reproductive
technologies. What was so outrageous about a Black mother choosing to
bear a white child when white couples make a similar choice almost every
time they engage the services of a fertility clinic? Roberts implies that the
source of the outrage is in the fact that white children should be genetically
tied-and therefore belong-to whites only. A final, intriguing example
Roberts mentions is the fact that maternal surrogates who are to provide
both eggs and gestation services are valued according to their characteris-
tics. A Black surrogate is not interchangeable with a white one. This
means that feminist opponents of surrogacy miss something important when
they claim that surrogacy is objectionable because it commodifies and treats
women as fungible. To the contrary, Roberts argues, "Surrogacy. .. is so
troubling precisely because its commercial essence lays bare how our soci-
ety actually does value people."4
These examples are not without problems-one reason white people
are not as willing to adopt Black infants is because of the position against
transracial adoption taken by the National Association of Black Social
Workers, and no doubt the circus surrounding the sperm mix-ups was due
partly to the fact that they were so publicly obvious. Nevertheless, these
cases, especially the surrogacy example, demonstrate the ways in which
race might drive the decisions of so many of the people who avail them-
selves of the new reproductive technologies. However, the strength of
Roberts' case depends, I think, on whether she is right about both the fact
that white people are very much invested in genetic ties and the fact that
Black people are much less invested in them. Many would argue that these
dynamics are driven mainly by the fact that couples just want a child that is
"like" them. Just as most people partner with individuals of their own race,
they are more likely to want children who look like themselves. Under this
view, given that there are so few white children to adopt relative to the
numbers of white couples who want them, white couples are more likely to
choose new reproductive technologies to achieve this goal. Blacks on the
other hand, would not have to utilize such extreme strategies because there
are plenty of adoptable Black children. And, as it turns out, Black middle
class couples do adopt at rates disproportionate to their numbers in the
population.42
Roberts shows, moreover, that economic barriers prevent Blacks from
utilizing the new reproductive technologies to the same extent as middle-
class whites. But surely this is also true of poor whites, and it does not tell
us very much about what Blacks would do if they had the money. If it was
more affordable, Blacks, like whites, might demonstrate that they place just
41 Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).
42 See Zanita Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 Harv. Black-
Letter J. 39 (1993).
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as much stock in genetic ties as whites do.43 Roberts anticipates this point
and notes that the use of reproductive technologies may be a function of
self-selection as well as economics. Even middle-class Blacks do not use
reproductive technologies as much as their white middle-class counterparts.
She explores a number of reasons, in addition to economic barriers, for
Blacks' lower rates of usage of the new reproductive technologies. For ex-
ample, she highlights the history of reproductive counseling and sickle-cell
screening, and she shows that what was supposed to be a strategy to help
Blacks ended up being a tool to abuse them. This history, along with other
examples of medical experimentation, such as the infamous Tuskeegee
syphilis experiment, may lead Blacks to distrust the new reproductive tech-
nologies. Roberts suggests that retelling stories about these incidents rein-
forces Black distrust of doctors and the government, and she points to these
fears as "rational explanations for reluctance" to utilize processes such as
in-vitro fertilization. She also notes there may be less rational explanations,
such as a woman's attribution of her infertility to fate or God's will. Such a
woman will be less likely to seek an answer in science.'
I was intrigued by Roberts' almost passing reference to "less rational"
reasons for the failure of Black women to utilize modem reproductive tech-
nologies. More analysis of this last point would have been extremely bene-
ficial for two reasons. First, the way that Roberts presents the reliance of
some (many?) Black women on faith in God to address fertility issues re-
veals that unanalyzed class dynamics are at work. Second, this idea that
Black women would sit by~passively and "accept" fate is somewhat incon-
sistent with the image of their resistance that Roberts sets out in the first
chapter of her book. As to the first point, Roberts quotes Elizabeth Heit-
man, a public health expert, who says, "'If infertility is one in a series of
negative, seemingly irreversible events in a woman's life, she may be more
likely to attribute it to fate or God's will than seek to address it in sci-
ence."' 45 Who are these women who are most likely to be overwhelmed
with insurmountable hurdles? Poor, less educated Black women, I suspect.
Is their lack of education, combined with their faith, the reason why their
reluctance to turn to science for help is considered less rational than reluc-
tance driven by the specter of the Tuskeegee experiments? No doubt many
poor, Black women often feel overwhelmed by their lives, and many seek
refuge in their religion. But it is probably a mistake to conflate their re-
course to faith with passively accepting their fate. The centrality of religion
in the lives of many Black women leads them to address infertility by rely-
43 We might soon get new data on this last point, as several states require IVF to be covered by
health insurance. See Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 2092 (1996).
44 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 259-60.
45 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 260 (quoting Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Prob-
lem: Wy Asisted Reproductive Technologies Are Not the Answer 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 94 (1995).
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ing on faith in God. This is consistent with taking an active role in ad-
dressing the problem.
This centrality of church and prayer life to many Black women leads to
the second reason why more analysis of the issue of "God's will" as a factor
in reproductive decision-making and its relevance to the importance of the
genetic tie to Black people. 6 Although it may be common for many
Americans to mistake deep faith for a lack of education, middle-class and
educated Black women, like their poorer counterparts, are very churched.
Their church participation is a key part of playing a role in the Black com-
munity in a way it may not be in non-Black communities 7 These middle-
class women may be just as likely as poorer women to believe that the use
of new reproductive technologies is simply not "God's best" and should
therefore not be chosen lightly.48
I suspect that to many Black women, especially those who are chur-
ched, fate and God's will are not interchangeable concepts. Women guided
by faith rely on and assert their faith as a source of guidance with their
problems. This aspect of faith is consistent with the image of Black woman
as "tigress" that Roberts presents in chapter one, where she details the
strategies of resistance adopted by slave women to avoid bearing their
master's children and to keep control of the children that they did bear, and
stands in contrast to the image of passive acceptance that Heitman's com-
ment implies. What I am suggesting here is that faith is more often a part of
the story of a Black woman's resistance than it is an aspect of acceptance.
But more than that, I am suggesting that faith is entirely consistent with the
desire of Black women to have a genetically -tied child. Given that the
church is central in the lives of Black women, further analysis of the rela-
tionship between religion and the election to use reproductive technology
by Black people would have provided an interesting addition, and possibly
a counter-story, to the one Roberts tells to explain Blacks' seeming disin-
terest in these options.
Roberts grounds this aversion of Blacks to the genetic marketing as-
pect of the new reproduction in their resistance to defining personal identity
46 Analysis of General Social Survey data for the years 1988 through 1991 (the only years between
1972 and 1994 that the question was asked), shows that 72.4% of Black women were members of a
church or synagogue compared to 67.1% of white women. That difference in the prevalence of active
prayer life (defined here as praying several times per day) was more stark: 42% of Black women re-
ported praying several times a day compared to 29.7% of white women. The comparisons between edu-
cated Black and white women are equally stark. Eighty percent of Black women reported praying
between once and several times a day, compared to 58.5% of white women. The data analysis and ex-
traction program for these percentages can be found at <httpJ/csa.berkeley.edu:7502/cgi-
bin/hsda?haracsda.3+gss94c>.
47 See C. ERIC LINCOLN AND LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 154 (1990) (arguing that the Black church is the central institution in many Af-
rican Americans' lives).
48 I quote a comment of a friend in a group of faithful, middle-class women with whom I discussed
this Essay.
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in biological terms 9 She contends that it is just less important to Blacks
than whites to have genetically related children. While the centrality of
kinship networks in the Black community is well-known, and while the in-
creasing interest among Black people in Afrocentrism helps to bolster Rob-
erts' claim that "Black people's search for their ancestral roots [often
focuses] on cultural rather than genetic preservation."50 I am less confident
that Black people are not keenly interested in the genetic tie. Maybe Blacks
have historically looked to political and cultural ties to define the group
precisely because whites monopolized genetic ties. Just as Roberts argues
that whiteness could only be transmitted through genes, some argue that
Blackness can only be transmitted through "culture." This notion is at the
heart of the transracial adoption debate, as Roberts explains.' Of course, as
she notes, these arguments are mirror images.
Roberts spends less time, however, acknowledging the potential desire
for Black people to appropriate the genetic tie for themselves, implicitly ar-
guing against that idea. Economic barriers have precluded many Black
people from demonstrating their investment in genetic ties, and it is really
too early to tell how many Blacks will attempt to use these procedures once
the full effect of insurance coverage is felt. Interestingly, of the Black cou-
ples I am aware of who are trying in-vitro, more than a few have expressed
their reasons for doing so in terms of genetic ties-not to perpetuate kids
who just look like they do, but genetically tied children who can help them
to "perpetuate strong, Black families." I mention these couples not in an
attempt to refute Roberts' claim about the numbers of middle class Blacks
who use new reproductive technologies, but to highlight their reasons for
doing so. Consistent with Roberts' claims about the importance of rela-
tional ties among Blacks, most of these couples also want to adopt. But
they do not view adoption as a substitute for genetic ties. To these couples,
the desire for genetically tied children, and adopting orphaned Black chil-
dren, exist on an equal plane.
IV. CONCLUSION: A NOTE ON ROBERTS' "MEANING OF LIBERTY"
After her wide-ranging and insightful assessment of the way that race
shapes Black women's reproductive choices, Roberts concludes with a
chapter in which she attempts to reconcile the interests in insuring that both
liberty and equality are appropriately valued in reproductive decision mak-
ing. Roberts begins by asserting that "the dominant view of liberty reserves
most of its protection for only the most privileged members of society" be-
cause that "approach superimposes liberty on an already unjust social
49 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 261.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 272-76.
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structure."52 This means that we are all protected from the most egregious
government intrusions. But it also means that those of us with the least
means of exercising choices are not guaranteed the means to be able to
make them. Roberts relies on this last point to persuasively argue that de-
fining liberty in terms of freedom from government interference with pri-
vate decisions has meant that the many battles over reproductive liberty
have centered an whether government can limit a woman's access to abor-
tion or birth control rather than on challenging government programs that
limit a poor woman's ability to have a child. Sometimes, Roberts writes,
liberty values are explicitly privileged over equality values in the debate
over reproductive liberties. She quotes scholar John Robertson, who argues
that "'the demands of equality should not bar access for those fortunate to
have the means [to access new reproductive technologies]."'' 3  Roberts
notes that many who defend this view claim that it is necessary to protect
individuals against the vagaries of totalitarianism. But, Roberts cautions,
unless we focus on the interests of poor women in making reproductive de-
cisions, we will continue to ignore, and perhaps worsen, inequality.
Roberts herself is not unconcerned about totalitarianism. She regards
liberty as a key component in ensuring that Black women maintain auton-
omy over their procreative decisions. Roberts advocates, however, a view
of liberty that goes well beyond simply a right to be free from negative in-
terference. She believes that it should also include,
the affirmative duty of government to protect the individual's personhood
from degradation and to facilitate the processes of self-detennination. Under
this postliberal doctrine, the government is not only prohibited from penalizing
welfare mothers or crack-dependent women for choosing to bear children; it is
also required to provide subsistence benefits, drug treatment, and medical
care.5
4
Anyone who believes that government should play a greater role in facili-
tating human flourishing would have difficulty disagreeing.
What is interesting is that Roberts grounds this vision in attention to
race consciousness. "Racism has stunted Americans' imagination of repro-
ductive freedom and stymied development of liberating reproductive poli-
cies that would benefit everyone. Only by exploding racism's hold can we
hope to envision and achieve reproductive justice."5 Attention to the racial
inequities in the programs and processes Roberts has identified surely
would be useful and beneficial. But will attention to racial inequities do the
52 See id.
53 Id. at 297 (quoting JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 226 (1982).
54 Id. at 309-10.
55 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 311.
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work that Roberts claims for it? I am not so sure, and the heterogeneity of
class and political sensibilities among Blacks that I pointed to earlier may
be an indication of the limitations of such a view. Greater attention to class
inequities is also necessary to achieve the vision that Roberts promotes.
And it is more likely that such a vision will be more politically acceptable.
After all, much of the work that Roberts asserts must be done will be situ-
ated in the legislature, not the courts. Universal remedies often demand
more universal arguments. In the case of enhancement of reproductive lib-
erty, we all will benefit from seeing the ways in which both race and class
inhibit progressive policies for reproductive autonomy.
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EXCAVATING THE "CHINESE WALL": TOWARDS A SOCIO-HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION ADMINISTRATION AND CHINESE EXCLUSION
LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING
OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW. By Lucy E. Salyer. University of
North Carolina Press, 1995. Pp. 338. $17.95.
Reviewed by Estelle T Lau
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1893, the Supreme Court issued its seminal immigration decision
Fong Yue Ting1 which held that a nation has the right to deport aliens law-
fully residing within its borders. Justice Brewer dissented, but reaffinmed a
sovereign nation's right to exclude. He stated that a national government
has control of all matters relating to other nations and therefore has the
power to build, what he called, a "Chinese wall." He argued that "the na-
tional government has the power to build a Chinese wall around our borders
and absolutely forbid aliens to enter."
2
At the time that Justice Brewer wrote his dissent he may not have been
aware of the particular accuracy of his choice of metaphors. Burgeoning
research now recognizes the irony of Justice Brewer's predictive choice of
imagery by demonstrating that the United States' immigration administra-
tive processes and Chinese immigrant identities are products of their mutual
confrontation and interaction. We have started to find that with the pro-
nouncement as a nation of our right to exclude and to deport, we truly be-
gan to build a Chinese wall.
Lucy Salyer's book, Laws Harsh as Tigers3 provides a needed, though
limited, starting point in our archeological excavation of this Chinese wall.
In this Essay, I describe how Salyer's book appears to challenge traditional
* Associate Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. B.A. 1987
Wellesley College; M.A. 1989 University of Chicago; J.D. 1992 Harvard Law School. Thanks to Guy-
ora Binder, David Engel, Laura Lau, Schlegel!, Susan Silbey, Robert Steinfeld, and Jim Wooten for
their insightful comments to this book review and my research project in general.
I Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
2 Id. at 738.
3 LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
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